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GYH Authors Assess Transparency of INTERPOL's Corrective Measures in *Harvard International Law Journal*

By Dr. Ted R. Bromund

The INTERPOL General Secretariat's response to abuse of the INTERPOL system relies on a set of compliance tools known as "corrective measures."

Three GYH authors – Sandra Grossman Esq., Charlie Magri Esq., and Dr. Ted R. Bromund – recently assessed the transparency of these corrective measures for the *Harvard International Law Journal* in an article titled "Corrective Measures and the Problem of Transparency at INTERPOL."

Corrective measures are codified in INTERPOL's Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD). These measures include enhanced supervision of a National Central Bureau (NCB), temporary suspension of processing rights, and, in serious cases, restrictions (including suspension of access or processing rights) that must be approved by INTERPOL's Executive Committee.

That corrective measures are used is not in doubt. INTERPOL acknowledges that "since the entry into force of the RPD in 2012, interim and corrective measures have been applied with regard to different NCBs on different occasions." What INTERPOL does not disclose is which member states are subject to these measures, what conduct triggered intervention, how long the measures lasted, and what assessment led to their end.

The effect of INTERPOL's secrecy is that both the measures and their targets are shielded from view. The few occasions when INTERPOL has disclosed corrective measures demonstrate both their potential and the inadequacy of confidentiality.

The decision to publicize corrective measures selectively, naming some states but not others, introduces political considerations into the very mechanism meant to safeguard impartiality. It effectively ties disclosure to the scale of external outrage or geopolitical importance. This not only violates the spirit of INTERPOL's Constitution but makes acknowledgment of abuse within INTERPOL conditional on unrelated events.

The GYH authors argue that routine disclosure of corrective measures is both feasible and necessary. At a minimum, INTERPOL should publish annual statistics on the number and duration of such measures.

More meaningfully, full disclosure of the mechanisms governing corrective measures, naming states subject to these measures and specifying their duration and outcome, would align INTERPOL's practice with its constitutional commitments. The only truly neutral approach, and the one most likely to deter future abuse, is to treat all states subject to corrective measures equally, by naming them all.